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I. Introduction 
In Germany, there is there is general consensus that unemployment rates are too 
high. In autumn 2006, the registered unemployment rate was 9.6%, which amounts 
to approximately 4 million unemployed. Since 2002, the German unemployment rate 
has even exceeded the EU average, which was unprecedented in the past (see 
Figure 1 on standardized unemployment rates in the Annex). At the same time, the 
duration of unemployment has increased dramatically: In 2005, more than one third 
of those registered as unemployed were long-term unemployed, i.e. unemployed for 
more than 12 months. 
Although all economists agree that a major precondition for employment creation is 
sustainable economic growth of at least 2% per annum, they disagree about the 
effects of the institutional framework on the labour market: Optimistic observers 
stress the high performance of external trade and the highly specialized small and 
medium-sized companies operating at high potential. These have a well-qualified 
workforce, which relies on the existence of a highly differentiated system of labour 
market institutions that provide a reliable basis for sustainable economic 
development. These analysts point to the fact that economic growth and the demand 
for labour is appropriately restrained by the extremely low domestic demand (Horn 
2005). Conversely, pessimistic observers blame the relatively high labour costs 
resulting from institutional regulation by labour and social law, collective bargaining 
and labour market policies as the main barrier to the creation of employment. Despite 
their differences, both the EU employment strategy and the OECD job strategy serve 
as frameworks and references for German economic and labour market policy-
making. While the OECD’s strategy mainly promoted the deregulation of labour 
market institutions, such as dismissal protection and collective bargaining systems 
(OECD 1994 and 1999: For a critical perspective cf. Schmitt/Wadsworth 2002), the 
EU employment strategy focused on the social dimension of employment and the 
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enhancement of active labour market policies that support social integration and 
qualification of the labour force.3 
As the German employment system can be generally characterised as highly 
protective and favourable to employees in respect to their labour rights, democratic 
participation in the economic sphere and the level of social protection, this article 
addresses the question of the consequences of these two diametrical strategies for 
the underlying principles of the German employment system. The main argument will 
show that intentional government reforms are a factor that only partly accounts for 
the ongoing basic changes. Other factors that influence the system are ongoing 
changes in social practices and initiatives or rulings by supra-national organisations. 
                                            
3 The initial EU employment strategy that was adopted at the Luxemburg summit in 1997 was a four-
pronged approach. It aimed at the enhancing workers’ employability through qualification efforts, 
supporting entrepreneurship by encouraging people to run their own businesses, supporting business 
in its adaptation to new market demands and strengthening equal opportunity policies. It focused on 
the strategy of activating social expenditure and supporting transition into paid employment rather than 
on deregulating existing labour market and social institutions. 
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II. The regulatory framework of the German employment system 
 
A number of minor, mainly deregulating reforms have been introduced to labour law 
to tackle the problem of rising unemployment (see Table A1 in the annex) since it 
began to steadily increase in the mid-eighties. However, these reforms were rather 
symbolic as they had hardly any effect on the level of employment protection but 
caused fierce debates on the underlying principles of the German employment 
system. In 1998, the new Red-Green government took the chance to develop major 
labour market reforms. These major reforms included amendments to the domain of 
labour law and active labour market policies as well as to the unemployment 
insurance. Albeit under fierce discussion and strongly criticised by some of the 
employer’s organisations, the German system of collective bargaining has remained 
unchanged so far. Nevertheless, new practices are evolving that entail far-reaching 
changes to the system of collective bargaining. 
1. Labour law  
The German labour law, whose core elements are dismissal protection, the 
regulation of working hours and parental leave and codetermination on the company 
level, provides a relatively high level of social protection to the German employees. 
This legislation may have quite different impact however, on different groups within 
the German workforce.  
1.1 Dismissal protection 
According to the OECD definition and analysis, Germany figures among the 
countries with the strongest dismissal protection (OECD 1994). Tight regulation of 
fixed-term employment and dismissal protection are considered to be most 
obstructive to job creation and the hiring of employees as these regulations reduce 
for the freedom of companies to dismiss workers in periods of economic downturn. 
Albeit largely shared by European economists and policy makers, this assumption 
has not been empirically proven to date. On the contrary, dismissal protection is also 
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considered to have a positive effect in the long term as it enhances employment 
stability and the perception of employment security. Employees may feel encouraged 
to invest in company-specific as well as general qualifications and develop a stronger 
commitment to their employer. In both cases, employee productivity would increase 
in the mid-term and possibly allow the employer more flexible adaptation to work 
organisation and new technological processes. 
Employment protection – dismissal protection and the regulation of fixed-term 
contracts –  has undergone changes within recent years. Until 2004, the regulation 
exempted only very small companies with less than five employees and protected 
employees from the first day of the employment relationship, although probation 
periods of up to six months were legal. New legislation has increased this threshold 
to 10 employees so that now firms with up to ten employees are exempted by new 
hirings. Further deregulation has been discussed, including the abrogation of 
dismissal protection during the first two years of employment and another increase in 
the employee threshold bringing it up to 20 employees. Under this model, only 9% of 
employees would remain covered by dismissal protection. The social-democrats, 
who participate in the Federal Government, reject these plans pointing to the 
changes that have been made to the regulation of fixed-term employment: Employers 
are permitted to conclude fixed-term contracts with a duration of up to 24 months 
without justification. If they refer to justifications formalised in the law, fixed-term 
employment relations may even exceed this two years. An average of about 8% of 
dependent employees (excluding apprentices) have a fixed-term contract. But 
indeed, in West Germany, over one third of new entries to the labour market (East 
Germany nearly the half) have fixed-term contracts (data from 2002). 
1.2 Working-time regulation 
The law regulating working time, which was reformed in 1994, principally allows for 
working times of up to 48 hours and under certain conditions, of up to 60 hours a 
week. In fact, collective agreements on the branch level have reduced regular weekly 
working time to between 35 and 40 hours. Unlike in the UK, very long working hours 
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are quite rare in Germany (Anxo/O'Reilly 2000). In Germany, women have much 
shorter working hours than men as a large percentage of them work part-time: On 
average, women work 30.8 and men work 40.2 hours per week (Klenner 2005, S. 
199). 
In contrast to the situation in France, the improvement of part-time work opportunities 
as a means of reconciling paid and family work has been demanded by the women’s 
movement since the 1970s, but the right to part-time work was first introduced in 
2001 by the Part-time Work Act, which also regulates fixed-term employment, and by 
the Parental Leave Act of 2002. According to the former, workers can request a 
reduction in working hours provided that they have been employed by the company 
for at least 6 months and the company employs more than 15 employees. The 
Parental Leave Act allows the parents of children under three years of age to reduce 
their weekly working-time to a maximum of 30 hours under the same conditions. 
However, the new regulation simply reinforced a development that began long ago, 
women’s option for part-time work. The proportion of men working part-time is about 
6% in both parts of Germany. About two thirds of Western German women opt for 
part-time work in order to reconcile paid employment with family duties, while only 
one fifth of Eastern German women do so. The majority of the latter (56.4%) opt for 
part-time work because they cannot find full-time employment. Men who opt for part-
time work for family reasons are still quite rare, more so in the East (3.8%) than in the 
West (13.1%) (Bothfeld 2005, S. 140). This reflects the high division of labour 
between German men and women, which is far less pronounced in the Nordic 
countries – or in Slovenia, were differences in the employment rates are far smaller 
than in Germany. 
1.3 Codetermination 
Perhaps the most typical feature of working conditions in Germany is the regulation 
of codetermination by the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz - 
BetrVG), which enables workers in companies with at least five employees to 
organise works council elections. The works council is entitled to information and 
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codetermination rights on issues under debate; e.g. it must be informed and heard in 
personnel decisions; decisions related to social issues such as working-time 
organisation and to management’s demand for overtime and short-time work require 
its approval. The works council can conclude agreements with the company’s 
management as long as they complement collective agreements concluded by trade 
union representatives; but it may not conclude collective agreements itself (see 
Section 2.1) or call for strikes. Both rights are reserved to the trade unions and the 
Works Constitution Act obligates works councils to support order and peace within 
the company. In 2002, works councils covered about the half of all German 
employees (48%), albeit only 11.0% of companies – a fact that may be due to the 
high percentage of small companies (with less than 50 workers) in Germany (cf. 
Table 1). This proportion however, has remained stable during the past ten years. 
 
Table 1: Companies and employees with works councils in Germany by firm size, 1998 and 
2002  
Percentage on all companies/employees (1) 
Company Size   
All Companies 
5 - 50 
employees
51 - 100 
employees 
101 - 199 
employees 
200 - 500 
employees 
> 500 
employees
 Companies with works councils as % of all companies 
1998 10 6 46 74 84 92 
2002 11 7 45 72 85 95 
 Employees in companies with works councils - as % of all employees 
1998 48 11 48 75 85 95 
2002 48 12 46 73 86 96 
(1) Private sector with at least five employees excluding agriculture and charitable organisations. 
Source: IAB-firm panel (6th and 10th wave for West Germany and 3rd and 7th wave for East 
Germany). 
 
Trade unions are interested in maintaining good relationships with works councils – 
especially those of big companies – as their contact with the workers is the most 
important source for the recruitment of new members. However, works councils’ 
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interests can conflict with the trade unions objectives, which has been the case e.g. 
in relation to overtime or the use of so-called “opening-clauses” to sectoral collective 
agreements. Insofar, works councils try to pursue their workers interests and agree to 
overtime even though trade union policy might aim at the reduction or elimination of 
overtime in order to increase employment rates (through a redistribution of working 
time). In certain cases works agreements may undercut working conditions that are 
specified in sectoral agreements; this must be stipulated within the agreement 
concerned in an “opening clause”.4 At the beginning of the 90s, these clauses were 
mainly used to regulate working time arrangements. These clauses are more and 
more frequently used to regulate temporary working time reductions or temporary 
reductions in pay with the objective of maintaining employment and avoiding 
dismissal (Bispinck/Schulten 2003). At present, opening clauses are agreed to when 
a sector experiences decreasing business volumes and companies use them when 
they would otherwise have to reduce their workforce. These so-called “company 
pacts for employment and competitiveness” have become widespread – an 
estimated 29% of all companies that were covered by collective agreements (in 
2002) have made use of these agreements. Of course, this development is 
problematic for the trade unions, as the increasing use of opening clauses 
fundamentally places the system of sectoral collective bargaining in question 
because it entails decentralising effects, i.e. shifts in collective bargaining from a 
sectoral and regional level to a company level (Bispinck 2005). In general, this 
development is considered to question the trade unions’ role within the system of 
collective bargaining as such. This accounts for the trade unions’ fundamental 
scepticism towards these forms of “controlled decentralisation” albeit they cannot 
avoid them without losing legitimacy among their members.  
                                            
4 Of course, cases where companies arbitrarily violate collective agreements (“uncontrolled 
decentralisation”) also occur Bispinck, Reinhard/Schulten, Thorsten (2003): Decentralisation of 
German Collective Bargaining? Current Trends and Assessments from a Works and Staff Council 
Perspective, WSI-Mitteilungen, Jg. 56, Special Issue: Industrial Relations in Germany, p. 24. . 
12 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Parental leave regulation 
Of course, there are many other domains of legal regulation that influence the 
German employment system. The law on sick pay and the law on parental leave are 
among those that have been frequently debated in recent years. 
The parental leave reforms of 2001 and 2006 also belong to the major reforms of 
recent years. These reforms became necessary because EU law stipulated that 
beyond the maternity leave of 8 weeks after childbirth5, an individual right to three 
months leave must be guaranteed to each parent. Although parental leave already 
existed, it was not in line with EU law as the entitlement to leave was not 
individualised but depended on the other parent’s employment status. Since the 
reform in 2000, both parents can reduce their working hours or take full-time leave at 
the same time until the child’s third birthday. Aside from an income-tested, flat-rate 
benefit of € 300. -, which was paid for a maximum duration of 24 months, the leave 
was unpaid. Because the responsibility for family work continues to be assigned to 
women, women’s active employment rate, especially when they have (small) 
children, has remained very low – only about one third of women with a child under 
three years of age were actively engaged in employment in 2003. (see Fig. 1). For 
this reason, a parental leave wage replacement benefit was introduced in 2006. 
Working parents with children born after the 1st January 2007 are entitled to a 
replacement benefit of 67% of their previous net salary (resp. the difference if they 
reduce their working time) for a duration of 12 or 14 months leave if each parent 
takes leave for at least two months of this period. It is most advantageous however, if 
parents make sequential use of the benefit rather than sharing it equally and 
simultaneously since the cumulative duration is limited to 14 months independent of 
whether parents use it as a full- or part-time income replacement., The scope of this 
new regulation is therefore limited in terms of promoting gender equality , the more 
so as substantial child care provision is still not guaranteed for under-3-year olds. 
                                            
5 The total duration of maternity leave in Germany is 14 weeks – of which 6 weeks can be taken prior 
to the birth, and of which 8 weeks are obligatory following childbirth. Here, the German regulation 
conforms with the requirements of the ILO Convention of 1952. 
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Figure 1 – Employment rates of men and women with at least one child of under three years of 
age in the EU countries, 2003 
 
 
No reliable data is available for Ireland, Sweden and Malta. The average difference 
between the employment rates of men and women is 39% for the EU-25.  
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, 2003 
 
The increase in child-care provision has become another major issue in family policy 
(Klammer 2004). Both issues are core elements of the EU employment strategy, 
although they are not subject to EU regulation, but rather to the EU “Soft Law” – 
namely the open method of coordination between the EU member states (Lefresne 
2007). 
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2. The German system of collective bargaining 
The German labour law is complemented by the system of collective bargaining, 
which produces collective agreements on working conditions and pay. The German 
constitution guarantees trade unions and employers associations the freedom to 
conclude agreements (Tarifautonomie). The Act on Collective Agreements 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz) specifies the issues and conditions of collective bargaining. The 
core element of this law is the so-called favorability principle (Günstigkeitsprinzip), 
which stipulates that collective agreements may establish minimum standards that 
may not be undercut by company agreements concluded by works councils. The 
latter may pass regulations that specify working time arrangements and they may 
stipulate higher levels of pay but they may principally not undercut standards that 
have been determined on the collective sectoral level (for exceptions see the 
paragraph on opening clauses in section 1.3). Agreements to higher pay levels than 
those stipulated in the collective agreements have regularly been made by large 
companies in the metal manufacturing industry. 
2.1 How relevant are collective agreements? 
Collective agreements are concluded between the regional or national entities of 
trade unions and employer’s associations and they are valid for all employees of a 
branch that belongs to the employer’s association that concludes the agreement. 
Collective agreements however, can be extended to an entire branch by the Labour 
Minister of a state (Land) or the Federal State (Bund) and gain a quasi-statutory 
status as working or pay conditions become binding for a whole branch 
independently of the membership of employers and employees (Allgemeinverbind-
lichkeitserklärung – AVE, cf. Table 2). Further, collectively agreed pay standards can 
become a reference for companies that apply these standards voluntarily. 
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Table 2. The three forms and levels of regulation within the German system of collective 
bargaining 
 Regulating 
Body  
Object of Regulation Examples 
   Working time Pay 
Law Parliament (All) companies, (all) 
employees 
 
Act on working time 
(6x8 hours per 
week, up to 60 
hours exceptionally) 
No minimum wage 
legislation 
Collective 
agreement (TV) 
(sectors/federal 
level or regions/ 
company) 
Regional or 
national unit of 
trade union and 
employers’ 
federation/ 
company 
management 
AVE: State 
Ministry of 
Labour 
Working conditions 
and pay in all 
companies that belong 
to a sectoral or 
regional employers’ 
association or: All 
companies of a sector 
and region if TV is 
extended 
35-40 hours of 
contractual weekly 
working hours 
(excluding overtime 
work) 
Pay levels and 
nominal amounts 
(agreements with a 
term of 1-2 years); 
special benefits 
(leave pay, 
Christmas pay) 
Works 
agreement 
(Betriebsverein-
barungen) 
 
Company 
management 
and works 
council 
Specification of 
collectively agreed 
working and pay 
conditions 
Working time 
reduction, working 
time arrangement, 
compensation for 
working time 
reduction 
Possible 
supplements, 
 esp. supplements 
to special benefits 
 
The German system of collective bargaining has been eroded by two developments 
during the last fifteen years: The decrease in trade union membership and their 
relative loss of political power, and the process of decentralisation that was 
reinforced by the German unification as a consequence of the general decline of the 
German manufacturing sector as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the German collective bargaining system remains crucial in 
determining working conditions and pay levels since the legal framework confines 
these areas to regulation by collective bargaining. Concerning wages, it should be 
stressed here that unlike the majority of EU member states, Germany has no 
minimum wage legislation so that collective agreements provide the only references 
for pay standards in Germany. 
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2.2 The decrease in trade union membership 
Another development that threatens the German system of collective bargaining is 
the “internal” erosion of the German labour movement as trade union membership 
has continued to decline for more than 15 years.  
The German trade unions are organised by sector and principally represent 
employees of one sector independent of their actual activity (unlike in Denmark, 
where workers of one company belong to different trade unions or in France, where 
trade unions are politically structured). The eight trade unions that belong to the 
biggest German trade union federation, the DGB, counted 6.8 million members in 
December 2005. Of course, the former GDR had a high degree of trade union 
membership but many workers were not integrated into German trade unions or quit 
them after the unification. The total number of members was 11.8 million in 1991. 
Today, about 20% of all employees belong to a DGB-led union.  
Declining union membership is a problem as the waning financial basis decreases 
their capacity for campaigns and mobilisation.6 Additionally, trade unions defending 
the interests of their members in the political discourse on labour market reforms 
have often been portrayed as social actors setting barriers to necessary and 
indispensable reforms. The traditional good relationship with the Social Democratic 
Party has also suffered in recent years and this has led to major disputes about 
recent labour market reforms. Finally, this problem is also aggravated by the fact that 
employers increasingly quit the employers federations or opt for membership without 
binding obligation (OT Mitgliedschaft) in order not to be bound by collective 
agreements (Behrens 2003): If employers are not full members of an association, the 
concluded agreements are not binding for them unless they have been applied to the 
entire branch by the Labour Minister, which has become very rare. The practice of 
partial membership is mainly followed by companies that need to gain advantages in 
                                            
6 The decrease in membership is a phenomenon that can be observed in the majority of EU member 
countries. Between 1990 and 2002, the average decrease was – 7.6%; in Germany the decrease was 
11.2%. The decrease was still higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries (AUS, NZ, UK) and highest in the 
post-communist countries (HUN; PL etc.) (Visser, 2006: 38).  
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cost competition, for example in the retail sector. However, collective agreements  
remain an indispensable instrument of regulation as they still cover about 70% of 
German employees in the West and 50% in the East (cf. Fig. A2 in the annex). 
Nevertheless, this percentage is steadily decreasing. 
2.3 Does the increase of low-income earners threaten the system of collective 
bargaining? 
Another problem for the trade unions strategy is the growing number of people 
earning very little money. Recent analyses have defined low-income earners as full-
time employees who earn less than two thirds of the median wage within a national 
employment system. The overall average of low-income earners in the EU is 15%; 
comparative figures from 2001 show that Great Britain has the largest share with 
19.4% and Denmark the smallest with only 8.6% (European Commission 2004: 168). 
It is estimated that there are approximately 20 million low-income earners in the EU.  
According to national statistics, 17% of German employees were low-income earners 
in 2004. The threshold for low-income in Germany is relatively high. In 2001, it was € 
1700. - (Rhein et al 2005). About two thirds of low-income earners are women and 
surprisingly, low qualified workers are hardly over-represented among them. Low 
wages however, may be attributed to two different mechanisms. On the one hand, 
companies may simply refuse to pay salaries stipulated in collective agreements, 
either because they fail to comply with a regulation of the federation or because they 
have quit the federation in order to avoid the obligation of complying with pay 
standards. On the other hand, collective agreements, especially in some areas of the 
services sector, stipulate very low pay levels. For example, the normal basic wage for 
hairdressers, florists or cleaners is about € 1300. - per month (gross wage).7 For low 
qualified workers however, there are collectively agreed pay standards that fall even 
                                            
7 The Archive for Collective Agreements at the Hans-Böckler-Foundation (WSI-Tarifarchiv) constitutes 
the largest and most important research unit that registers and analyses current developments in 
wage policies and the conclusion of collective agreements. Theses for a European minimum wage 
policy were formulated in 2005 see: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/wsi_2005_thesen_mindlohn_en.pdf. 
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below these thresholds and amount to only 50% of the average wage, e.g. in 
agriculture or private households. In 2006, the German Trade Union Congress 
decided to demand the introduction of a legal minimum wage as it exists in other 
European countries. At 7.50 Euro per hour, it would not exceed the average 
minimum wages that already exist in other EU member countries such as France or 
the UK (Bispinck et al. 2006). The problem of increasing numbers of low-income 
earners and growing wage disparities will however persist. In all, the German trade 
unions, even though they figure among the strongest trade unions in the EU, are also 
exposed to new political tensions and conflicts and need to adapt their political 
strategy to these new challenges.  
3. The Activation strategy within the German Unemployment 
Insurance 
The continuous deterioration of the labour market situation accompanied by rising 
unemployment rates and the increasing percentage of long-term unemployed have 
been the main driving forces for the most recent labour market reforms. These may 
represent the most comprehensive reforms to labour market legislation since the 
establishment of the active labour market policies and the coming into force of the 
“Labour Promotion Act” in 1969. Of course, several reforms have been undertaken 
since then, e.g. the first step of deregulation of fixed-term employment in 1985, the 
restructuring of the active labour market policy in 1997 and the amendment of the 
principles of active labour market policy in 2001 (see Table A1 in the annex). The so-
called “Hartz reforms” however, were the furthest-reaching reforms as they tackled 
almost every domain of the employment system, including the regulation of 
unemployment insurance, which had remained unchanged until that point in time. 
The amendments to active labour market policy and to the unemployment insurance 
system were the core elements. In the literature, these reforms have been 
considered “paradigmatic” as they are strongly oriented towards the “activation” of 
the unemployed. 
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3.1 The underlying concept of labour market “activation” 
The concept of activation is currently the most debated solution to the problem of 
rising unemployment figures and social expenditure in the EU member states. The 
activation strategy departs from a former tolerance of the fact that many unemployed 
who received unemployment benefits remained at home, doing little to alter their 
situations. Rather than passively living on social benefits, they should be actively 
searching for a new job or participating in labour market programmes. Moral and 
economic arguments are usually inextricably interlinked in this perspective (Trickey 
2001; Barbier 2004). 
The economic critique of the existing benefit system is that unemployed persons 
remain passive because the economic incentives to return to paid employment are 
too weak. The economic rationale assumes that the unemployed would prefer to stay 
at home when unemployment benefit systems are generous and employers are not 
willing to pay sufficiently high wages8. In this perspective, unemployment insurance 
systems with long durations and generous levels of benefit payment are considered 
to be positively correlated with the duration of unemployment periods and 
consequently, higher levels of unemployment. However, unlike in the US, a longer 
employment search e.g. in Germany is associated with a better matching of the 
supply and demand of paid labour and secures it in the long term (Gangl 2002). 
Finally, long-term unemployment correlates with rising unemployment rates and 
decreasing labour demand; and as the most recent experiences have shown, many 
long-term unemployed in Germany prefer very badly-paid, publicly-supported jobs to 
unemployment. And even if the micro-economic argument that unemployed persons 
prefer being recipients of social security to reintegrating into paid work accounts for a 
small minority of the unemployed in a short term perspective. This argument certainly 
underestimates two aspects: The social relevance of paid employment to social 
identity and social recognition and the fact that a decent level of social security, at 
                                            
8 The reservation wage defines the wage level that unemployed would accept and take up paid work 
rather than remaining on unemployment benefits. 
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least in a long-term perspective, can only be derived from paid work. Both arguments 
certainly hold for the majority of citizens. To sum up, generous unemployment 
benefits do not unavoidably deter unemployed persons from searching for 
employment but if they do so, longer search periods may also have positive effects 
on the quality of employment as they lead to a better matching between the of supply 
and demand of labour. Consequently, a generous benefit system may even avoid the 
loss of human capital. 
The moral critique of generous benefit systems is twofold. A very negative view 
assumes that it is not legitimate that long-term unemployed receive benefits without 
contributing to the general welfare of a society. Sometimes, especially when cases of 
freeloading or the abuse of social benefits are exposed by the media, the 
unemployed are considered undeserving of social benefits. The public discourse on 
the social security system in Germany increasingly questions the legitimacy of long-
term unemployment benefits and portrays the unemployed as freeloaders and as 
being costly to the social security system. This opinion, of course, questions the two 
basic principles of the German unemployment system: The principle of equivalence 
and the principle of solidarity. These two principles mean that employees acquire 
legal entitlement to benefits in the event of unemployment through payment of a 
proportion of their earnings as contributions in advance and that they are entitled to 
collectively organised social security when they encounter risks such as 
unemployment, old age or sickness. Of course, the relationship between 
contributions and benefits is subject to legal determination – and political decisions – 
as well as the definition of what is considered a social risk that should be covered by 
collective schemes. In Germany, the view of being unemployed is changing slightly: 
Unemployment is increasingly interpreted as being due to an individual deficit and 
not to a structural economic problem. 
A more empathetic view considers that the social state should assume responsibility 
for social benefit recipients in a more elaborate manner than merely paying benefits: 
Public policy should develop policy measures that enable, qualify and motivate 
citizens to participate in the labour market. With reference to the (core) objective of 
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the EU employment strategy to enhance the employability of employees and the 
unemployed, employment experts recommend an expansion of public employment 
programmes and that a larger share of labour market expenditure be spent on active 
measures (Schmid et al. 1992). Although this basic, normative idea has influenced 
the most recent labour market reforms in Germany, the question of how public 
expenditure could be better used for active measures, and how measures can be 
allocated to the unemployed, remain largely unsolved so far. In addition to these 
technical questions however, the relationship between the German welfare state and 
its citizens is at present undergoing a process of redefinition in terms of what social 
rights are appropriate and how they can be articulated by public structures such as 
the administration, the social code, adjudication and politics. Of course, trade unions 
and other autonomous social groups try to influence these debates from the 
employees’ perspective.9 
3.2 The German unemployment benefit system 
Before the reform came into force in 2005, German unemployment insurance was 
one of the most generous systems in the EU. Unlike most of the others, the German 
system consisted of the unemployment benefit that was usually paid for a period of 
one year10 followed by unemployment assistance, which was paid until the end of the 
unemployment period. Both benefits were income related in order to secure the living 
standard of the unemployed person; the wage replacement rate of the unemployment 
benefit was set at 60%, and at 53% for the unemployment assistance. Both 
replacement rates were topped up to 67% and 57% respectively if the unemployed 
person had custody of dependent children. The unemployment insurance benefit – 
                                            
9 The political protest against the labour market policy of the red-green government has even lead to 
the foundation of a new left-wing party in Western Germany, which merged with the left-wing post-
communist party of the Ex-RDA before the last elections in September 2005 . 
10 The benefit duration depended on the duration of contribution and the age of the unemployed. The 
benefit duration of one year was attained after one year of contributions. Older workers, over 58 e.g. 
could attain benefit durations up to 32 months.  
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as well as the active labour market policy measures – is financed by contributions, 
which amount to 9% of the gross wage. The employee’s share (4.5%) is deducted 
directly from their wages by the employer and transferred to the Federal Labour 
Office.11 Because the growing expenditure for benefits was considered too high and 
the employers’ contributions as weighing too heavily on labour costs, the demand for 
a reduction of expenditure and the reduction of contributions became more urgent. 
Although a number of proposals for a reform of the financing of the system were 
developed, the recent reform tackled exclusively the expenditure and not the income 
side of the system.12 The main initiative was the merger of the social assistance and 
unemployment assistance schemes in order to eliminate a dualistic principle that was 
notoriously inefficient. The main objective of this merger was to eliminate the different 
treatment of recipients of social assistance and unemployment assistance in terms of 
employment promotion and to give recipients of social assistance better access to 
the active labour market policy measures, thus making their integration into the 
labour market easier. Another objective was to bring an end to the ongoing argument 
between the municipalities that were responsible for the regulation and payment of 
social assistance and the local public employment agencies that were responsible for 
the recipients of unemployment benefits. In addition to the organisational problems of 
which organisation would take care of which groups and how financial compensation 
between the federal office and the municipalities should be regulated, the question of 
the level of benefits also had to be resolved.  
Justified by the argument that too generous benefits would hinder the quick 
reintegration of unemployed persons into paid employment, and after a fierce debate 
and hard bargaining processes within the parliament, the level of benefit for the long-
                                            
11 Unlike the unemployment benefit, unemployment assistance was tax-financed and its administration 
was incumbant upon the municipalities. Unemployment assistance recipients however had access to 
the labour market policy programmes. 
12 Experts demand e.g. that the employment promotion and occupational training measures be 
financed using taxes or alternatively, that income be increased by integrating self-employed or public 
servants into the system. Another proposal referred to the basis on which contributions are calculated, 
suggesting it could be extended to included capital and other income. 
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term unemployed was reduced to the level of the former social assistance. At the 
same time, the maximum duration of the unemployment insurance benefit, for which 
the wage replacement rate remained unchanged, was reduced to 12 months. This 
resulted in a dramatic deterioration in the income situation of a large number of long-
term unemployed: Since 1.1.2005, long-term unemployed receive a quite low 
monthly benefit of € 345. - in the West and € 331. - in the East.13 At the same time, 
the rules according to which private real estate or cash assets are taken into account 
have become much stricter, and include the property of the partner. A further 
amendment that makes this reform so drastic, is that the criteria for employment that 
a long-term unemployed person must accept in order to maintain his or her benefit 
entitlement have also been made much stricter.14  
The changes to unemployment insurance do not only impair the financial situation of 
unemployed persons, but they also reinforce the subjective perception of uncertainty 
and social insecurity of the unemployed. On the societal level, the reform is an 
expression of a shift in the underlying social consensus about what a decent social 
standard is. To sum up, the reform leaves a number of questions unresolved, e.g. 
concerning the quality and forms of standard employment, the level of decent pay 
and how reasonable protection against poverty should be shaped in order to avoid 
downward mobility. The trade union’s interest in introducing a minimum wage as well 
as the old Green Party’s demand for the development of basic income regulation, 
appear to be both legitimate and appropriate. To put it briefly, the merger of 
unemployment assistance with social assistance and the fundamental changes in the 
German system of social rights raise the question of how the old German Welfare 
State should adapt to ongoing and growing economic challenges (for a discussion on 
the changes see Bothfeld 2006). 
                                            
13 Of course, the benefit recipients can get housing benefits that is paid according to the rent they pay. 
14 Long-term unemployed must now accept every employment – also those small jobs without social 
security contributions and entitlements – that are not indecent. This includes the obligation to accept 
badly paid jobs - a mechanism that may lead to substantial pressure on wage bargaining in the long 
run. 
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III. Driving forces and remaining questions 
 
We have seen that policy reforms proceed at very different speed in all three areas. 
We can distinguish three different factors that drive these reforms: Concrete 
government projects and initiatives that are based on experience with the existing 
institutions and programmes, changes in social behaviour and dominating social 
practices that occur and that are more or less well described by social scientists and 
finally, supra-national policy making that may either lead to binding regulation as in 
the EU policy-making system or to the development of the discourse of reference as 
in the case of the OECD policy strategy (cf. Table 3). Of course, these forces are not 
independent, but inextricably interlinked. Nevertheless, it appears fruitful for policy 
analysis to distinguish these three factorial complexes as the latitude of action for 
national policy-makers becomes clearer. In fact, it is the national government that 
takes account of both social behaviour and supra-national issues to varying extents 
in the course of its work (developing labour market policy programmes). 
Table 3: The driving forces of institutional change within the German employment system 
 Labour law Collective bargaining Labour market policy 
Government 
projects and 
initiatives 
Since mid eighties: Continuous 
activities 
Debated but not 
realised 
Minor reforms since 
1969, major reforms 
since 2002 
Social 
behaviour/ 
changing 
practices 
Strong micro economic 
assumptions on companies’ and 
unemployed persons’ behaviour, 
gradual adjustment to changes in 
women’s employment orientation
Controlled and 
uncontrolled 
decentralisation 
Erosion of membership 
on both sides 
Assumption of massive 
misuse of social 
benefits but no 
supporting data 
 
Supra/ 
International 
regulation and 
policy-making 
EU law requires compliance of 
national legislation 
OECD job study supports de-
regulation, 
EU supports “flexicurity” strategy 
Sceptical view of 
centralised bargaining 
systems 
Massive (discoursive) 
support of activation 
strategy, strong criticism 
of the obvious 
inefficiency of labour 
market expenditure 
Source: Own analysis 
 
The ongoing changes in the German employment system entail three concrete 
questions that social and economic policy makers should explicitly address and that 
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have not been solved either by national or by supra-national policy strategies so far. 
First, the regular employment status (Normalarbeitsverhältnis) that has provided 
strong standards in terms of pay, weekly hours and working time organisation is 
losing its dominance, but it remains unclear what shape a new standard employment 
might take. In Germany, the increase in weekly working hours has been fiercely 
debated for two years, while at the same time, women’ average weekly working 
hours have continued to decrease. As many labour and social laws refer to a 
standard form of employment, the erosion of the regular employment status 
questions the institutional and legal framework as a whole. Legal amendments 
remain highly contradictory as they aim on the one hand to extend part-time work, 
self-employment, temporary contracts and small jobs, but on the other they still 
consider the regular employment status to be the reference e.g. for social security 
regulation. 
The second question addresses the standard of social security that should be 
maintained by social security schemes and labour market policy programmes. The 
reforms to the German unemployment benefit system came along without any clear 
and consensual definition of the necessary level of social security and the definition 
of social risks that should be covered by public intervention. It was mainly driven by 
the diagnosis that the increase in expenditure for passive measures was no longer 
tolerable as it did not help to bring the unemployed back into paid employment. The 
drastic reduction of benefits for long term unemployed to the level of social 
assistance was implemented very quickly as the result of internal Parliamentary 
Committee negotiations and without being accompanied by a broader social debate 
that might have lead to a new social consensus.15 The dissatisfaction of the Germans 
with the development in labour market policies has caused massive public protests 
                                            
15 Unlike the reforms to the pension scheme that have been ongoing since the end of the eighties, the 
time frame was extremely short and did not allow for social learning processes. In the area of pension 
politics however, the argument that demographic development requires fundamental adjustment of the 
existing schemes has been widely shared for a number of years, despite fundamental differences in 
concrete policy solutions that respond to this problem. 
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and the foundation of a new left-wing political party (Wahlalternative Soziale 
Gerechtigkeit – WASG), and it certainly contributed to the election result in 
September 2005, where neither of the two large political parties could gain the 
majority. Nevertheless, the definition of the standard and the organisation of social 
security remains core problems for the changing German Welfare State. 
The third question concerns the form of governance in social policy and this is 
perhaps the most fundamental problem as recent developments reveal a 
fundamental shift in power relations from public (parliamentary and social) structures 
to closed-shop, political and technocratic commissions. As we have seen, the basis 
of participation of social partners is waning at present, albeit in an incremental way. 
The fundamental reform of the unemployment insurance scheme was not subject to 
broad social debate and classical corporatist decision-making, both of which 
characterised former social policy decision-making processes. It is nevertheless, a 
fundamental task of a democratic welfare state to consider how societal and social 
actors shall and can participate in policy development in order to develop more 
consensual and sustainable solutions that are broadly accepted by the citizens within 
a national employment system. 
To achieve emancipation from internal and external driving forces, national policy 
decision-makers should address these three questions conscientiously and 
thoroughly and aim at the greatest possible integration of societal actors into public 
and political debate. However, this should not result in the avoidance of necessary 
social reforms, but lead to more consensual and more broadly shared solutions. Of 
course, cuts and reductions in benefits would then need to be compensated by 
complementary measures, e.g. a right to retraining or basic social security in old age 
in order to provide flexibility and security at the same time. A more fundamental 
participation of societal actors and a new balance between purely economic 
arguments and democratic decision-making would certainly lead to the development 
of more sustainable social policy. 
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Annexe 
Figure A1: Standardised unemployment rates in selected OECD countries 1986-2004 
Standardized Unemployment Rates in selected OECD-countries 1986-2004
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Note: As far as possible, the data has been adjusted to ensure comparability over time and to conform to the guidelines of the 
International Labour Office. All series are benchmarked to labour force survey-based estimates. In countries with annual 
surveys, monthly estimates are obtained by interpolation/extrapolation and by incorporating trends in administrative data, where 
available. The annual figures are then calculated by averaging the monthly estimates (for both unemployed and the labour 
force). For countries with monthly or quarterly surveys, the annual estimates are obtained by averaging the monthly or quarterly 
estimates, respectively. For several countries, the adjustment procedure used is similar to that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
U.S. Department of Labour. For EU countries, the procedures are similar to those used in deriving the Comparable 
Unemployment Rates (CURs) of the Statistical Office of the European Communities. Minor differences may appear, mainly 
because of various methods of calculating and applying adjustment factors and because EU estimates are based on the civilian 
labour force. 1. See technical notes in OECD Quarterly Labour Force Statistics. 
2. Data prior to 1993 refers to Western Germany. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 78 database. 
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Fig. A2 Coverage by collective agreements as percentage of all employees by form of 
collective agreement, 2004 
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Table A1: Legal reforms of the German employment system since 1969 
 Name Content 
1969 Labour Promotion Act 
(AFG) 
Objective: Securing a high level of employment, enhancing labour market structures. 
Giving priority to active labour market measures and preventive intervention through 
the promotion of professional mobility, vocational training, retraining and professional training 
measures.  
Introduction of entitlement to measures provided by the AFG. 
Fundamental restructuring of the Federal Labour Office (Bundesagentur für Arbeit - BA). 
1976 Budget Containment Act Reduction of professional training measures. 
Stronger focus on contributing employees. 
Restrainment of criteria for acceptable employment (Zumutbarkeit). 
1978 4. Amendment to the 
Labour Promotion Act 
The claim for employment assistance, the duration of which is unlimited, has to be renewed every 
twelve months.  
Obligation of recipients of unemployment benefits, employment assistance and training benefits 
to pay contributions to the pension scheme. 
Alteration of criteria for acceptable employment. Reduction of the personal choice to refuse a 
position on the grounds that it is unsuitable (Zumutbarkeit). 
1979 5. Amendment to the 
Labour Promotion Act 
Enhancement of the promotion of professional training (focus on short term measures that aim at 
identifying professional skills and knowledge).  
Enhancement of employability of the unemployed. 
Development of competence in local self-administration. 
Increased competence for local administration. 
Higher flexibility in the combination of labour administration measures. 
1984 Act on Early Retirement Objective: Replace elderly workers by registered unemployed. 
On the basis of a collective agreement or individual contract, workers over 58 years, who are 
willing end their employment careers, can opt for an early retirement benefit of 65% of their 
average gross wage of the previous six months. This is paid by the employer. 
If the employer hires a registered unemployed person to replace the worker who has retired early, 
the federal office pays a third of the early retirement benefit to the employer. 
1985 Employment Promotion 
Act  
 
Equal treatment of full-time and part-time workers. 
Prolongation of period of temporary agency work (from X to X months). 
Compensation procedure for sick pay. 
Temporary contracts can be concluded for a duration of up to 24 months without justification. 
1986 7. Amendment to the 
Labour Promotion Act  
Enhancement of instruments of vocational training, better access to employment creation 
measures (ABM) for elderly workers and the promotion of self employment for the unemployed. 
Maintenance of the social security function of unemployment insurance and unemployment 
assistance and enhancement of the social situation of the older and long-term unemployed. 
Reduction of level of contribution to the Federal Labour Office. 
1989 Amendment to the Labour 
Promotion act and 
amendment to the early 
retirement Act 
Part-time work replaces early retirement: Public subsidies allow for gradual transition to 
retirement for workers over 58 years of age. 
Employers are entitled to compensation by the Federal Office if registered unemployed are hired . 
to replace a semi-retired, elderly worker for at least 18 working hours per week. 
1994 Employment Promotion 
Act 
Labour market services are no longer limited to the Federal Office of Labour.  
Private and commercial providers can offer labour market services. 
Change and extension of active labour market policy instruments. 
1994 Working Time Act 
 
Replaces Working time regulation (Arbeitszeitordnung) of 1938. 
Allows more flexible working hours and stipulates the possibility for social partners to agree on 
diverging regulations. 
1996 Unemployment 
assistance Reform Act 
Reduction of the so-called original unemployment assistance to a maximum duration of one year 
(the o.u.a. was paid when the conditions of access to unemployment insurance where not 
fulfilled, e.g. in case of short-term employment contracts). 
Further cuts to professional training and retraining. 
Payment for positions generated by employment creation measures was reduced to 80 percent of 
collectively agreed wages. 
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1996 Act on Part-time 
retirement  
The Federal Labour Office pays subsidies to workers over 55 years of age, who reduce their 
working hours before the 31st  July 2001 and so enable their employer to hire an – otherwise – 
unemployed person. 
1997 Labour Promotion Reform 
Act 
Integration of Labour Promotion into the Third Book of the Social Code (SGB III). 
Change to the basic objectives of labour promotion: Focus on the increasing the level of 
employment is replaced by the objectives of enhancing professional and regional mobility, and 
promoting the reintegration of long-term unemployed and self-employment. 
Responsibility is shifted from the public to the labour market agents (supply and demand side of 
labour), the responsibility of the unemployed and his/her contribution to change their individual 
situation is stressed, individual obligations are stressed and sanctions are developed. 
Criteria for acceptable employment are again reduced and it is easier for the administration to 
withhold benefits.  
1998 Act on Social Security for 
Casual Workers  
Social protection of public health insurance, long-term care insurance, pension and 
unemployment insurance is maintained for employees during periods of leave.  
Social security contributions 
1999 Law on Regulation of 
Marginal Employment  
A uniform wage threshold for permanent small jobs is set at DM 630 per month for East and West 
Germany 
2000 Act on Part-time work and 
fixed-term contracts 
Objective: To promote part-time work and to make fixed-term employment easier by determining 
conditions for the conclusion of fixed-term contracts. 
Employees have the right to reduce their working hours if they have been employed for at least 6 
months by a company with at least 15 employees. 
Fixed-term contracts can be concluded for a maximum duration of 24 months without justification. 
For longer fixed-term contracts, employers must justify this according to the conditions prescribed 
by law. 
2001 JobAktiv-Gesetz Objective: To make labour promotion more effective by “activation“, to attain a high level of 
employment, to enhance the structure of employment and to promote the equality of men and 
women within the labour market. 
Employers are obliged to inform the labour offices of significant changes in their employment 
strategy. Further, they shall contribute to the maintenance of the employability of their workers 
Employees are expected to develop their own professional perspectives. 
Decrease of long term unemployment by quicker reintegration into employment by enhancement 
of labour market services. 
Introduction of job rotation schemes as a regular instrument. 
Integration of employees on parental leave into the pension scheme (contributions are paid by 
the Federal Labour Office). 
2002 First and Second Act on 
modern labour market 
services  
Obligation of employees to register as unemployed at the Labour Office as early as possible. 
Establishment of private service providers in all Local Labour Offices (PSA, Personnel Service 
Agencies). 
New instruments: Training vouchers for training; access to promotional measures for self-
employment is made easier (Ich-AG). 
Change in criteria for jobs that unemployed must accept (higher mobility, abolishment of any 
reference for pay of offered job). 
Wage threshold for small jobs is increased to € 400, Reduction of social security contributions for 
wages between € 400 and € 800 (Mini-jobs). 
2003 Act for the Modernisation 
of the Labour Market  
Reduction of benefit duration to 12 months (18 months for elderly unemployed over 54 years of 
age) 
2003 Third Act on modern 
labour market services 
Renaming of the federal office to “Federal Labour Agency”. 
General restructuring of organisation and working processes within the Labour Agency. 
2003 Fourth Act on modern 
labour market services  
Merger of two benefit systems: The flat-rate unemployment benefit II replaces unemployment and 
social assistance benefit and is paid to every needy, employable person. 
Social assistance remains reserved to non-employable persons (who are not able to work at least 
for 3 hours per day) 
Own and the partner’s income and assets are taken into account; means-test level is reduced. 
Reduced criteria for the right to reject a job as unacceptable and obligation to accept a “work 
opportunity“ without full social, labour rights and wages (compensated by a supplementary 
unemployment benefit II). 
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